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Brain Overclaim Redux
Stephen J. Morset

Introduction
In his dissenting opinion in Miller v. Alabama, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote, "teenagers are less mature, less responsible and
less fixed in their ways than adults-not that a Supreme Court
case was needed to establish that."' Precisely. It has been
recognized for centuries, as the common law defense of immaturity
and the establishment of a juvenile court system confirm, that the
law has long responded to the differences between juveniles and
adults. In its recent trilogy of juvenile punishment cases, the
Supreme Court gave explicit constitutional status to this
difference under some circumstances. In Roper,2 it categorically
held that capital punishment could not be imposed on adolescents
who committed murder when they were sixteen or seventeen years
old; in Graham,3it categorically held that life without possibility of
parole could not be imposed on juveniles who had committed nonhomicide crimes; and in Miller,4 it held that imposing mandatory
life imprisonment without possibility of parole on juveniles who
had committed homicide crimes was unconstitutional, but that
this sentence could be imposed in an appropriate case after
individualized review.
In Roper there was no specific mention of neuroscience as a
basis for the Court's reasoning and conclusions, although some
have interpreted without support some vague language about
"other science" as referring to neuroscience. In Graham there was
a non-specific reference to neuroscience, but it was arguably
dictum because it was used to support a proposition that no one
denied: namely, that the science of adolescent development since
Roper continued to confirm the Court's earlier reasoning about
adolescent development. No one claimed that the science had
t. Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology and
Law in Psychiatry, Associate Director, Center for Neuroscience and Society,
University of Pennsylvania. I thank Ed Greenlee for his invaluable help.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2480 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
3. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
4. 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
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markedly changed to suggest that adolescents possessed
psychological characteristics that rendered them apparently more
responsible than the Roper majority thought. In Miller, the
majority cited Graham's citation of the neuroscience to support the
view that the brain science continued to show fundamental
differences between adolescents and adults that are relevant to
responsibility. In a footnote, the opinion noted that, "The evidence
presented to us in these cases indicates that the science and social
science supporting Roper's and Graham's conclusions [about
adolescent psychological characteristics] have become even
stronger."' The material cited, however, was conclusory and
relatively non-specific. Again, however, no one was arguing that
the social science and neuroscience suggested little difference
between adolescents and adults. Moreover, if the science in Roper
and Grahamwas sufficient to support their categorical holdings, it
was certainly sufficient to support Miller's requirement of an
individualized determination.
Thus, the Miller citation was
arguably dictum and it was certainly additive and superfluous at
best. The real question remains why some advocates are so
excited by the citation of neuroscience for an already indisputable
set of behavioral propositions about the indisputably behavioral
criteria for criminal responsibility. What does the neuroscience
really add?
In an earlier paper written in the light of Roper, I tentatively
identified a hitherto unrecognized psychological disorder, Brain
Overclaim Syndrome (BOS),' and noted its symptoms, which are of
course provisional until the syndrome is fully empirically
validated. The symptoms are: 1) confusion about the brain-mindaction connection; 2) confusion about the distinction between an
internal and external critique of legal doctrine and practices; 3)
misunderstanding the criteria for responsibility, especially failure
to recognize that the criteria are fully folk psychological; and 4)
confusion of positive and normative claims, especially failure to
recognize that a behavioral or neural difference between groups or
individuals does not per se entail different legal treatment.! The
paper recommended Cognitive Jurotherapy (CJ) as the treatment
5. Id. at 2464 n.5. The quoted material incorrectly draws a distinction
between social science and "science." Social science, like neuroscience, is science.
The important distinctions are between good and bad science and between legally
relevant and legally irrelevant science.
6. Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility:
A DiagnosticNote, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006).
7. Id. at 403-06.
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of choice.'
My combing the relevant literatures since first
identifying BOS convinces me that the syndrome is still endemic
among writers in the relevant fields and that, apparently, too few
have received CJ. Perhaps the Affordable Care Act will remedy
that to some degree.
This brief contribution to the symposium has the modest
goals of identifying one further symptom of BOS and of suggesting
that neuroscience, for all its spectacular advances in the wake of
non-invasive functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging [fMRI], still
has limited value-added when assessing juvenile law policy, such
as questions of adolescent responsibility and competence, and
individual cases. The next section of this Article addresses the
new, provisional symptom: overconfidence about the current
status of neuroscience, especially as it relates to human action.
Then, I turn to the problem of "translation" between
neuroscientific findings and law's folk psychological responsibility
criteria, even in those cases when the neuroscience is clearly valid
science. This Article next considers what the neuroscience really
adds to what we already knew behaviorally and what its
implications are. The following section speculates about why BOS
is so rampant. A brief section speculates about the potential
contributions of neuroscience to more rational, fair adjudication,
and the paper concludes by recommending CJ yet again. Although
I share the goals of the advocates for gentler treatment of
adolescent offenders for the same reasons they provide, the most
general thesis of this Article is that the neuroscience evidence was
not necessary to reach these goals and emphasis on the
neuroscience tends to foment BOS and to avoid focusing on the
sociocultural and psychological variables that account for vastly
more of the variance in explaining juvenile offending and juvenile
responsibility.
Overconfidence in Neuroscience: A New Symptom
of BOS
All too often, advocates for the legal relevance of neuroscience
have exaggerated notions of how much we already know and how
firm the science is. The purpose of this section is to encourage
"neuromodesty," the recognition that we know less than we hope.
The most general problem is that the relation of brain, mind,
and action is one of the hardest problems in all science. We have no
I.

8. Id. at 410-12.
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idea how the brain enables the mind or how action is possible.9
Some people, termed "mysterians," believe that consciousness is the
hardest problem in science and may be beyond the capacity of the
human mind to solve." The brain-mind-action relation is a mystery.
For example, we would like to know the difference between a
neuromuscular spasm and intentionally moving one's arm in exactly
the same way. The former is a purely mechanical motion, whereas
the latter is an action, but we cannot explain the difference between
the two. We know that a functioning brain is a necessary condition
for having mental states and for acting. After all, if your brain is
dead, you have no mental states, are not acting, and indeed are not
doing much of anything at all. Still, we do not know how mental
states and action are caused. Until we solve the "mind-body"
problem-and we may never do so, although I am agnostic about
whether it is possible-there will be limits to what neuroscience can
disclose about human behavior.
Despite the astonishing advances in neuroimaging and other
neuroscientific methods, we still do not have sophisticated causal
knowledge of how the brain works generally, and we have little
information that is legally relevant. This is unsurprising. The
scientific problems are fearsomely difficult. Only in the last decade
or so have researchers begun to accumulate much data from fMRI,
which is the technology that has generated most of the legal interest
and enthusiasm.
Moreover, virtually no studies have been
performed to address specifically legal questions."
Let us consider the specific grounds for neuromodesty in
cognitive, affective and social neuroscience, the subdisciplines most
relevant to law. At present, most neuroscience studies on human
beings involve very small numbers of subjects, although this
phenomenon is starting to change. Most of the studies have been
done on college and university students, who are hardly a random
sample of the population generally, and of offenders, specifically.
9. PAUL MCHUGH & PHILIP SLAVNEY, THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHIATRY 1112 (2d ed. 1998).
10. For a discussion of the difficulties investigating such differences, see, for
example, COLIN McGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME (1999).
11. There are notable exceptions. E.g., Eyal Aharoni et al., Neuroprediction of
future rearrest, available at www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1219302110 (2013)
(demonstrating with a prospective design and the use of official records that a
neural marker can contribute to the accuracy of prediction of re-arrest). Also, the
MacArthur Research Network on Law and Neuroscience is engaged in
neuroscientific studies of adolescent development and responsibility, mental states,
and memory that are addressed specifically to legal issues. For a description of the
network, see, http://www.lawneuro.org/.
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There is also a serious question about whether findings based on
subjects' behavior and brain activity in a scanner would apply to
real world situations. In other words, are the tasks "ecologically
valid," i.e., are they related to "real world" behavior and would
subjects behave in the "real world" as they do in the magnet? As
noted, few studies have been done for the purpose of illuminating a
legal issue or problem. Further, most studies average the neurodata
over the subjects, and the average finding may not accurately
describe the brain structure or function of any actual subject in the
study. Replications are few, which is especially important for law.
Policy and adjudication should not be influenced by findings that
are insufficiently established, and replications of findings are crucial
to our confidence in a result.
The neuroscience of cognition and interpersonal behavior is
largely in its infancy, and what is known is quite coarse-grained and
correlational, rather than fine-grained and causal." What is being
investigated is an association between a task in the scanner and
brain activity. These studies virtually never demonstrate that the
brain activity in a particular region is a necessary, sufficient, or
predisposing causal condition for the behavioral task that is being
done in the scanner." Any language that suggests otherwise--such
as claiming that some brain region is the neural substrate for the
behavior or language that suggests that a region in the brain is a
homunculus that is "doing" something-is simply not justifiable
based on the methodology of most studies. Moreover, activity in the
same region may be associated with diametrically opposite
behavioral phenomena-for example, love and hate.
There are also technical and research design difficulties. It
takes many mathematical transformations to get from the raw fMRI
data to the images of the brain that are increasingly familiar.
Explaining these transformations is beyond me, but I do understand
that the likelihood that an investigator will find a statistically
significant result depends on how the researcher sets the threshold
for significance. There is dispute about this, and the threshold

12. See, e.g., Gregory A. Miller, Mistreating Psychology in the Decades of the
Brain, 5 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 716 (2010) (providing a cautious, thorough
overview of the scientific and practical problems facing cognitive and social
neuroscience).
13. Moreover, the brain is a particularly complicated piece of biological real
estate. We are learning increasingly about the connections between various areas
of the brain, but claims that a specific region that activated is the only or primary
region associated with the behavior in the scanner are simply not justified in most
cases. We do not have sufficient understanding yet.
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levels are conventional. If the threshold changes, so does the
outcome. I have been convinced by neuroscience colleagues that
many such technical difficulties have largely been solved, but
research design and potentially unjustified inferences from the
studies are still an acute problem. It is extraordinarily difficult to
control for all conceivable artifacts. Consequently, there are often
problems of over-inference. Finally, it is also an open question
whether accurate inferences or predictions about individuals are
possible using group data when that group includes the individual.
This is a very controversial topic, but even if it is difficult or
impossible now, it may become easier in the future. Over time,
however, all these problems may ease as imaging and other
techniques become less expensive and more accurate, research
designs become more sophisticated, and the sophistication of the
science increases generally.
Virtually all neuroscience studies of potential interest to the
law involve some behavior (or condition) that has already been
identified as of interest, and the point of the study is to identify that
behavior's neural correlates. Neuroscientists do not go on general
"fishing"expeditions." There is usually some behavior or behavioral
condition-such as addiction, schizophrenia, or impulsivity-that
investigators would like to understand better by investigating its
neural correlates. To do this properly presupposes that the
researchers have already identified and validated the behavior
under neuroscientific investigation. Thus, neurodata can be no
more valid than the behavior with which it is correlated.
On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest that the behavior
(broadly construed as always to include actions and mental and
emotional states) is not well-characterized or is neurally
indistinguishable from other, seemingly different behavior. In
general, however, the existence of legally relevant behavior will
already be apparent before the neuroscientific investigation begins.
For example, some people are grossly out of touch with reality. If, as
a result, they do not understand right from wrong, we excuse them
because they lack such knowledge. We might learn a great deal
14. For an amusing exception, see Craig M. Bennett et al., Neural Correlates of
Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem Atlantic Salmon: An Argument
for Multiple Comparisons Correction, 1 J. SERENDIPITOUS & UNEXPECTED RESULTS

1, 1 (2009), availableat http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.161.8384&rep=repl&type=pdf. The study scanned a dead Atlantic
salmon to demonstrate that significant results can be obtained from the most
unpromising investigations unless the research design properly controls for chance
findings (false positives). Id.
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about the neural correlates of such psychological abnormalities, but
we already knew without neuroscientific data that these
abnormalities existed, and we had a firm view of their normative
significance.
The clear behavior with which neuroscientific investigation
begins in turn leads to what I term the "clear cut" problem. Studies
use subjects who clearly exhibit the behavioral condition under
investigation or who clearly are or are not being exposed to the
experimental condition.
Even if the study finds statistically
significant differences between the two groups, those differences are
not typically large and the curves overlap. This explains, for
example, why brain images demonstrating the structural
differences between the brains of people with and without major
mental disorders cannot be used for diagnostic purposes, even in
cases of severe disorder.
Again, however, the behavioral data
necessary to make the diagnosis-the criteria for all mental
disorders are behavioral-were already clear and the brain images
were not necessary. The law might need help in the less clear
behavioral cases, however, but those are precisely the cases in which
neuroscience will be of least help. The unclear cases will be even
more alike neurally than the cases in which the behavior is already
evident.
Finally, if the legal system were to start using brain imaging
routinely to help answer legal questions, such as whether the
subject is lying or remembers something, many subjects will have
an incentive to use countermeasures to invalidate the scan. Studies
have shown that subjects can quickly learn simple countermeasures
that are very effective.
Of course, neuroscientists might develop
markers of the use of countermeasures, but that would create
incentives to learn the countermeasures to the anti-countermeasure
techniques. And so on. Future science may solve this problem, but
it is at present a major technological problem even if various

15. Allen Frances, Whither DSM-V?, 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 391-92 (2009).

Many studies do find differences between patients with mental disorders and
controls, but the differences are too small to be used diagnostically. But see John
P.A. loannidis, Excess Significance Bias in the Literature on Brain Volume
Abnormalities, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 773, 777 (2011) (claiming, based on

a meta-analysis of studies of brain volume abnormalities in patients with mental
disorders, that many more studies than should be expected found statistically
significant results and attributing such results to strong biases in the reporting of
the data).
16. See, e.g., Giorgio Ganis et al., Lying in the Scanner: Covert Countermeasures
Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 55
NEUROIMAGE 312, 317 (2011).
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constitutional and other objections to involuntary scanning were

overcome.
In the future, we may learn more about the causal link
between the brain and behavior, and studies may be devised that

are more directly legally relevant. I suspect that we are unlikely to
make substantial progress with neural assessment of legally
relevant mental content, but we are likely to learn more about
capacities that may bear on excuse or mitigation. Even about the

latter we must nonetheless be cautious, however. For example, some
think that "executive capacity"-roughly, the congeries of cognitive
and emotional capacities that help to plan and regulate human
behavior-is going to be the Holy Grail to help the law determine an
offender's true culpability. After all, there is an attractive moral
case that offenders with a substantial lack of these capacities are
less culpable, even if their conduct satisfied the prima facie case for
the crime charged. Perhaps neuroscience can provide specific data
previously unavailable to identify executive capacity differences
more precisely. There are two problems, however. First, significant
problems with executive capacity are readily apparent without
testing, and criminal law simply will not adopt fine-grained
culpability criteria.
Second, the correlation
between
neuropsychological tests of executive capacity and actual real world
behavior is not terribly strong." Only a small fraction of the
variance is accounted for, and the scanning studies will use the
types of tasks the neuropsychological tests use. Consequently, we
are far from able to use neuroscience accurately to assess nonobvious executive capacity differences that are valid in real world
contexts.
In short, there is reason for some optimism about legallyrelevant advances in neuroscience, but we should not expect too
much.
II. Lost in Translation: Actions Speak Louder Than
Images
The criteria for responsibility and competence are completely
folk psychological-actions and mental states. Neuroscience is a
completely mechanistic science. Neurons, neural networks, and the
connectome do not have mental states such as intentions, they do
17. See, e.g., Russell A. Barkley & Kevin R. Murphy, Impairment in
Occupational Functioning and Adult ADHD: The Predictive Utility of Executive
Function (EF) Ratings Versus EF Tests, 25 ARCHIVES OF CLINICAL
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 157, 169 (2010).
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not have a sense of past, present, and future, and they do not have
aspirations. These are properties of persons. Is the apparent chasm
between those two types of discourse bridgeable? This is a familiar
question in the field of mental health law," but there is even greater
dissonance in neurolaw. Psychiatry and psychology sometimes treat
behavior mechanistically, sometimes treat it folk-psychologically,
and sometimes blend the two. In many cases, the psychological
sciences are quite close to folk psychology in approach.
Neuroscience eschews folk-psychological concepts and discourse."
Thus, the gap will be harder to bridge.
The brain does enable the mind (even if we do not know how
this occurs). Therefore, the facts we learn about brains in general or
about a specific brain could in principle provide useful information
about mental states and about human capacities in general and in
specific cases. Some believe that this conclusion is a category error.0
This is a plausible view, and perhaps it is correct. If it is, then the
whole subject of neurolaw is empty, and there was no point writing
this comment in the first place. Let us therefore bracket this
pessimistic view and determine what follows from the more
optimistic position that what we learn about the brain and nervous
system can be potentially helpful to resolving questions of criminal
responsibility if the findings are properly translated into the law's
folk psychological framework.
The question is whether some concededly valid neuroscience
is legally relevant because it makes a proposition about
responsibility or competence more or less likely to be true.
Biological variables, including abnormal biological variables, do not
per se answer any legal question because the law's criteria are not
biological. Any legal criterion must be established independently,
and biological evidence must be translated into the criminal law's

18. ALAN A. STONE, LAw, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 96 (1984) ("Psychiatry
has not yet found a unified discourse about organisms and persons.").
19. Paradoxically, however, neuroscientists frequently write dualistically by
suggesting that regions of the brain are little homunculi that do things and that
there seems to be a struggle between the self and the brain as an independent
agent.
See, e.g., Liad Mudrik & Uri Maoz, Me & My Brain: Exposing
Neuroscience's Closet Dualism in Studies of Consciousness and Free Will 1-2
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
20. See, e.g., M. R. Bennett & P.M.S. Hacker, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
NEUROSCIENCE 112, 270, 360 (2003); Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson,
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211,
1214 (highlighting the problematic nature of the claims made in support of
neurolaw and suggesting alternative directions for the field).
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folk-psychological criteria." That is, the advocate for using the data
must be able to explain precisely how the neurodata bear on
whether the agent acted, formed the required mens rea, or met the
criteria for an excusing or mitigating condition. In the context of
competence evaluations, the advocate must explain precisely how
the neuroevidence bears on whether the subject was capable of
meeting the law's functional criteria. If the evidence is not directly
relevant, the advocate should be able to explain the chain of
inference from the indirect evidence to the law's criteria. At present,
as the last section indicated, few such data exist, but neuroscience is
advancing so rapidly that such data may exist in the near or
medium term.
Moreover, the argument about relevance is
conceptual and does not depend on any particular neuroscience
findings.
The problem of translation is even more acute for legal policy
because the database necessary to reach firm conclusions simply
does not exist. As the previous section noted, there are few
replications of potentially relevant neuroscientific studies and -there
are problems with generalizing from the laboratory to the real
world. Even among populations of undoubted legal interest that
have been studied intensively by neuroscientists, such as
adolescents and addicts, the people who have been studied are not a
random sample of the population as a whole. We do not possess
baseline data in specific populations or the general population to
reach confident conclusions about what is normative. If we cannot
reach such conclusions, policy recommendations should not follow.
A final point about the translations problem is that actions
speak louder than images with very few exceptions. The law's
criteria are behavioral-actions and mental states. If the finding of
any test or measurement of behavior is contradicted by actual
behavioral evidence, then we must believe the behavioral evidence
because it is more direct and probative of the law's behavioral
criteria. For example, if an agent behaves rationally in a wide
variety of circumstances, the agent is rational even if the brain
appears structurally or functionally abnormal. We confidently knew
21. If a biomarker were virtually perfectly correlated with a legal criterion and
it was less expensive to collect the biological data than behavioral data, then the
biological variable might be a good proxy for a legal criterion. But this would be
possible only with clear, bright line legal rules and not with standards because the
latter have an inevitable normative component for the decision maker to assess.
Further, such standards can evolve, and trying to use an external marker to
adjudicate them would conservatively inhibit normatively driven evolution.
Moreover, such markers are beyond present neuroscientific expertise.
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that some people were behaviorally abnormal-such as being
psychotic-long before there were any psychological or neurological
tests for such abnormalities. In contrast, if the agent is clearly
psychotic, then a potentially legally-relevant rationality problem
exists even if the agent's brain looks entirely normal.
An analogy from physical medicine may be instructive.
Suppose someone complains about back pain, a subjective symptom,
and the question is whether the subject actually does have back
pain. We know that many people with abnormal spines do not
experience back pain, and many people who complain of back pain
have normal spines. If the person is claiming a disability and the
spine looks dreadful, evidence that the person regularly exercises on
a trampoline without difficulty indicates that there is no disability
caused by back pain. If there is reason to suspect malingering,
however, and there is not clear behavioral evidence of lack of pain,
then a completely normal spine might be of use in deciding whether
the claimant is malingering. Unless the correlation between the
image and the legally relevant behavior is very powerful, however,
such evidence will be of limited help.
III. The Legal Value-Added of Neuroscience
The juvenile trilogy-Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jacksonwith which this Article began is a good place to begin examination of
this topic. Common sense and a rich body of behavioral science
literature already demonstrated beyond peradventure that, on
average, adolescents differed from adults on psychological
characteristics such as judgment, impulsivity, risk-seeking, and
susceptibility to peer pressure.22 The Supreme Court argued that
such characteristics are relevant to assessing whether adolescents
are as legally responsible as adults.2 3 I believe the Court was correct
because these characteristics are all related to rationality, broadly
speaking, and the capacity for rational conduct is the crucial generic
responsibility criterion.24 I will return later to the question of
whether these differences entailed the legal conclusions about the
just punishments for juveniles that the Court reached. But first, I
will consider the question of what the neuroscience contributed.
Let us begin with some obvious considerations and some
22. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (summarizing the
evidence to this effect from Roper and Graham).
23. Id.
24. See Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
251, 264-66 (2000).
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implications for the law. If behavior is different, the brain will be
different. The brain enables the mind and action, although, once
again, we have no idea how.25 On average, adolescents behave
differently from adults in some potentially legally-relevant ways,
and thus it is unsurprising, to say the least, that on average
adolescent and adult brains are different. Although expected, this
difference has no legal implications per se as I shall discuss below.
Second, it is extremely unlikely that the relation between the
brain and behavior will be invariant in groups or individuals. The
brain is always changing, and the brain-environment interaction is
powerful. The causal relation between the brain and behavior is
going to be exceptionally complex, variable, and mediated by nonneural variables. Although the brains of well-nourished, healthy
adolescents in all countries are surely alike, there are striking
differences in crime rates and other potentially injurious behaviors.
Adolescents are not responsible for their level of brain maturation,
but brain maturation differences do not entail adolescent criminal
offending or differential legal treatment. Adolescents in other lands
are somehow able to transcend their immature neural biology and
to refrain from crime. Moreover, and more importantly, focusing on
the brain (and behavioral) differences between adolescents and
adults may cause us to avoid paying attention to the social and
cultural factors, especially those that are the product of injustice,
that better account for serious adolescent offending than biological
immaturity. In the right environment, adolescents can behave like
adults concerning serious criminal behavior.
Third, there will be substantial overlap in the biological
maturity of adolescent and young adult brains, especially at the
margin of legal adulthood. Many adolescents will have the greater
myelination of neural connections and pruning of gray matter
associated with adults and many young adults will have the lesser
myelination and pruning associated with adolescence. The same
overlap will be true of behavioral differences. It is often said that
the law must draw bright lines, such as the age of eighteen for
adulthood, for administrative convenience, and that adolescents are
still in the process of maturation and development. But if the
brains (and behavioral characteristics) of some younger and perhaps
not so young adults are indistinguishable from those of adolescents,
why can't an individualized determination be made about
culpability in an appropriate case? Brain maturation continues into

25. See McHUGH & SLAVNEY, supra note 7.
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the mid-twenties and the brain is plastic and always changing." In
Miller/Jackson, the Court conceded that an individualized analysis
of culpability was possible.27 Although more is at stake in life
without parole (LWOP) cases than in the usual array of criminal
punishment, in principle, individualized determination of
blameworthiness could always be accomplished. In their zeal to
soften the law's response to juvenile offenders, advocates for
adolescents who want to draw bright lines may be deflecting
attention from injustice towards older criminals who equally
deserve softer legal response.
Finally, recall that what we learn neurally is always
dependent on prior, clear identification of legally relevant behavior
or an already established condition, such as age, that is legally
relevant because its behavioral characteristics are probative of legal
criteria. In short, behavior is the gold standard; neurodata is simply
a handmaiden. . For example, any excusing condition must be
established independently. The goal is always to translate the
biological evidence into the criminal law's folk-psychological criteria.
What we learn about behavior neurally and psychologically may
affect the law's normative behavioral criteria, but such knowledge
will virtually never logically entail any general legal conclusion at
the policy level or in an individual case.
Now let us expand on some of the foregoing considerations to
understand what neuroscience has contributed to our
understanding of adolescent criminal offending. The overarching
theme is that the causal contribution of the brain and nervous
system is neither all-powerful nor well-understood.
The enormous temporal and geographical differences in
adolescent rates of offending suggests that in general the brain (and
other intra-individual variables) contributes only a small amount
causally in explaining criminal behavior in this group. The
spectacular decrease in homicide in the United States, and
especially in New York, since the 1990s is clearly not accounted for
by recent changes in the brain maturation rates of adolescents and
young adults in the United States. Although there is dispute about
the causes of the "great crime drop," it is clearly attributable to
sociocultural variables, as are the temporal and geographical
26. See Brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 24-27, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 357 (2009); C.
Antoinette Clarke, Bridging the Gap: An InterdisciplinaryApproach to Juvenile

Justice Policy, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 927, 934 (2007).
27. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68.
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differences generally."
The causal contribution of neural variables is also not well
understood. For example, there is no fixed, linear correlation
between brain maturity and criminal behavior. The correlation
between age and risk preference is u-shaped rather than linear,
although myelination seems to be linear. Moreover, one of the few
empirical studies that directly investigated the correlation between
risk-creating, dangerous behavior and myelination surprisingly
found that juveniles who engage in more dangerous activities have
more mature frontal white matter than their peers who behave
more conservatively.29 This is a surprising result, but more
replications are needed and social and cognitive neuroscience are
still too young to provide clear understanding of the causal role of
the brain, whether that role is small, as I suspect, or large.
Although our understanding of the brain does not seem to
add much to our knowledge about adolescent offending beyond what
we knew behaviorally and sociologically, it seems to confirm what
we already thought we knew about the average behavioral maturity
differences between adolescents and adults. Thus, we can be more
confident about our conclusions concerning these differences.
Suppose, however, that there were no obvious brain differences, such
as those concerning myelination and pruning. I am confident that
we would still assume that there were brain differences that our
methods were simply too unsophisticated to detect and our
confidence in the validity of the behavioral differences would be
unaffected. After all, we had a common law infancy excuse for
hundreds of years and almost a hundred years of having a juvenile
court before diffusion tensor imaging was developed. Note, too, once
again, it is the behavioral differences that are directly relevant to
the legal criteria for responsibility because those criteria are
themselves behavioral. In short, even if the neuroscience is
consistent with our behavioral understanding and thus tends to
confirm that understanding, there is very little value added when
the behavioral data are already so clear.
I believe that many of the claims for the relevance and added
value of neuroscience concerning adolescent offenders are best

28. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK'S
LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL (2012).
29. Gregory S. Berns, Sara Moore & C. Monica Capra, Adolescent Engagement
in Dangerous Behaviors Is Associated with Increased White Matter Maturity of
Frontal Cortex, 4 PLoS ONE e6773. (2009), http://www.plosone.org/article/info
%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0006773.
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characterized as more "rhetorically relevant" than genuinely
relevant. That is, advocates for juveniles (or other groups) hope that
the fetching images produced by "real" neuroscience will be more
persuasive to decision makers than evidence to date provided by
apparently more suspect social and behavioral science, even if the
advocate cannot say precisely how the neuroscience answers the
legal question.
Please permit me to offer an instructive anecdote that
illustrates the point. At a conference, I was presenting to a group of
judges the case study of Spyder Cystkopf/Herbert Weinstein, a sixtytwo-year-old retired businessman who had strangled his wife to
death during an argument and then threw her out the twelfth story
window of their apartment building.30 It was later discovered that
on the underside of the middle lining surrounding his brain, he had
a large, benign cyst that pressed on and displaced a large amount of
his frontal cortex."' The brain image showing the displacement is
spectacularly arresting. Based on this finding, the defendant was
going to raise the insanity defense, claiming that he could not
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.32 The behavioral
history and evidence were entirely inconsistent with the validity of
this claim and after presentation of both the prosecution and
defense arguments, one hundred percent of the judges voted to
convict. I then asked the judges if they would consider the cyst a
mitigating factor at sentencing. About a third of them indicated
that they would consider it, so I asked them why. The modal
response was that the defendant had a proverbial "hole in his head."
I asked why, if it did not affect his behavior, it should be considered
a mitigating factor. None of the judges who indicated a willingness
to consider it had any adequate explanation except to repeat the
(true) observation that he had a gross anatomical abnormality. With
respect, having such an abnormality is not per se an excusing or
mitigating condition unless it produces a genuine mitigating
condition such as diminished rationality or diminished control
capacity. But there was not a shred of evidence that the defendant
had such problems. The judges were taken in by a stunning image
and thought that such an abnormality simply "must" have
mitigating implications. Now, the best study to date of the effect of
30. People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); see also
Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 Geo. L.J. 527, 537-40 (1996) [hereinafter
Morse, Brain and Blame]. "Spyder Cystkopf" was a pseudonym used before the
case record was published. Id. at 527 n.1.
31. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
32. Id. at 718, 723.
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images on decision making concerning culpability surprisingly
found little effect," but the anecdote does illustrate rhetorical
relevance if not genuine relevance. In the next part of this Article, I
will address further the irrational exuberance fueling attempts to
use neuroscience to answer questions of criminal responsibility.
Finally, suppose that we understood the neural mechanisms
underlying problematic behavior or that we could effectively
intervene to prevent it using neuroscientific knowledge. What
should we do? Should we now "medicalize" antisocial behavior
simply because it has partial biological roots? If partial neural
causation were an adequate justification to medicalize behavior as
the sign of a disorder, then all behavior should be medicalized
because all behavior is neurally caused at least in part. Further,
eliding the crucial distinction between mad and bad is a conceptual,
moral, and political error. They are different types of behavior that
deserve different moral and political responses according to moral
and political theories we have reason to and do endorse. The civil
liberties implications of treating badness as madness in order to
more easily control behavior we fear is deeply disquieting, as our
lamentable experience with quasi-criminal sexual predator
commitments has demonstrated."
Neuroknowledge might be useful if it demonstrated that our
behavioral assumptions about adolescents were incorrect, but it is
not clear how it would do this. If there are clear, valid behavioral
differences, they are still valid, even if they are not obviously related
in a systematic manner to neural differences. Likewise, if behavior
is the same, brain differences among those who behave similarly
would not convince us that the behavior is really different. Once
again, behavior is the gold standard for law.
In principle, I suppose, neuroscience might help us
understand why adolescents have more difficulty than we thought
exercising a legally relevant capacity, such as the capacity to selfregulate their behavior. But without some behavioral test of such
diminished capacity, how would we know that the neuroscientific
findings are indicative of it? Problems like this may be solved by
technological or scientific advances in the future, but for now,
neuroscience provides little added value to legal responsibility

33. Nick J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense:
No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 357, 382 (2011).
34. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1035 (2002) (criticizing the criteria for sexual predator
commitments on conceptual, empirical, and legal grounds).
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assessments and policy beyond what behavioral science already
provides.
Finally, valid neuroscientific studies that somehow did add
value beyond mere confirmation of what behavioral science already
disclosed would not entail legal changes unless the neuroscience
demonstrated that the behavioral assumptions underlying legal
doctrine were flatly wrong. Then doctrine should change, but such
neuroscientific discoveries are unlikely to occur with any frequency
because the neuroscience always begins with the behavior of
interest, which is the gold standard.
Assuming that new neuroscience findings do not
demonstrate that the law's behavioral assumptions are erroneous,
they may nonetheless demonstrate hitherto unknown differences
between adolescents and adults. If so, whether these differences
should have legal consequences depends on the normative
assumptions governing the context. For example, the adolescent
punishment trilogy correctly notes that on average the rational
capacities of adolescents do differ from those of adults, but whether
those differences are large enough to necessitate a legal difference,
such as categorically banning the death penalty for juveniles, is
purely a normative question about which science must fall silent."
The Court could have held, for instance, that the average adolescent
was still rational enough to be executed even though the average
adult was more rational. After all, there are surely substantial
rationality differences among the adults sentenced to death and
equally surely the most rational sixteen or seventeen-year-old
capital murderers are as rational as the least rational adults
sentenced to death. Thus, the Court could have held that capital
case decisions for adolescents should be as individualized as they
are for adults, but with the presumption communicated to capital
sentencing juries that adolescents were on average less rational
than adults. These alternative holdings are fully consistent with
the finding of difference. As the next section explains further, those
who believe that the added value of neuroscience is that it will
entail preferred legal consequences are still suffering from BOS
because they do not fully comprehend the distinction between the
positive and the normative.

35. Let me be clear. I fully support the outcomes in the trilogy, but do not
believe that they were logically or constitutionally entailed by the psychological or
neural findings.
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IV. Endemic BOS and Irrational Neuroexuberance
Neuroscience is fascinating and is making rapid advances. It
captures the attention because it promises at last to reveal the
inner, mechanical workings of our brains and the images it produces
are, well, way cool and often very beautiful. Nonetheless, we know
much less, especially about legally relevant behaviors, than most lay
people think and as honest scientists concede. Our failure to
understand how the brain enables the mind explains why the oftquoted metaphor about finally "getting under the hood" is grossly
misleading and question-begging. We understand the mechanics of
a car engine perfectly. We can specify how an engine makes
automotive locomotion possible. But we could not begin to specify
the relation between brain and mind, even in principle. The brain is
part of nature and subject to the physical laws of the universe,36 but
it is a part of nature that produces the capacity for consciousness,
intentionality, aspirations, a sense of past, present, and future, and
all the other mental phenomena that make life worth living for
homo sapiens. Even if both car engines and brains are subject to
the laws of nature, mental states (and unaided, intentional human
locomotion) are distinguishable from purely mechanical locomotion
and the explanation of the former will be infinitely more
complicated if it is soluble at all. It is possible that our mental
states are epiphenomenal products that can be reduced to brain

states, but this is unlikely to be true, even if one accepts physicalism
or materialism. To date, the inter-theoretic reduction project has
eluded us in the easiest case, chemistry to physics, and has
completely eluded us in the hardest case, mind to brain. Assuming
that brains are just like engines begs the question in favor of
reductionism with no warrant. How much neuroscience will
actually help us understand human behavior is an open question.
If my cautious account of what neuroscience offers law at
present is accurate, how does one account for the irrational
36. See H. Allen Orr, Awaiting a New Darwin, 60 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 26 (2013)
(reviewing THOMAS NAGEL, MIND AND COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEODARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF NATURE Is ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE (2012)).
Professor Orr does concede, however, that although the materialist project of
reducing mind to matter appears to be the proper approach, "we haven't the
slightest idea how it would work." Id. at 27. But see THOMAS NAGEL, MIND AND
COSMOS: WHY THE MATERIALIST NEO-DARWINIAN CONCEPTION OF NATURE IS
ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSE (2012) (providing an extended argument for why natural
selection is unlikely to account for mental life and especially consciousness). The
book has been heavily criticized. I disagree with Nagel for the reasons Orr and
others give, but Nagel is one of the foremost philosophers in the world and the
argument deserves to be taken seriously.
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exuberance of those who think it will imminently lead to major
beneficial (so they hope) reforms and perhaps even to a revolution in
our responsibility practices? What follows is pure speculation, but I
believe that two factors, legal insecurity and advocacy bias, are the
jurotoxic agents that account for most of the cases of BOS that I
encounter and treat daily. Let us consider these in order.
Virtually every legal issue is contested-the criminal
responsibility of older juveniles is a classic example-and there is
always room for debate about policy, doctrine, and adjudication.
In a recent book, Professor Robin Feldman has argued that law
lacks the courage forthrightly to address the difficult normative
issues that it faces." The law therefore adopts what Feldman
terms an "internalizing" and an "externalizing" strategy for using
science to try to avoid the difficulties."
In the internalizing
strategy, the law adopts scientific criteria as legal criteria." A
futuristic example might be using neural criteria for criminal
responsibility. In the externalizing strategy, the law turns to
scientific or clinical experts to make the decision." An example
would be using forensic clinicians to decide whether a criminal
defendant is competent to stand trial and then simply
rubberstamping the clinician's opinion."
Neither strategy is
successful because each avoids facing the hard questions and
impedes legal evolution and progress.4 2
Professor Feldman
concludes, and I agree, that the law does not err by using science
too little, as is commonly claimed." Rather, it errs by using it too
much because the law is too insecure about its resources and

37. ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 7 (2009) (asserting that

science does not provide answers for the law but rather allows those in the legal
field to ignore their failure to resolve legal questions).
38. Id. at 8-14 (introducing the concepts of internalization and externalization
relationships between science and law).
39. Id. at 8 (defining internalization as "importing scientific lines to resolve a
legal dilemma").
40. Id. at 14 (defining externalization as "tr[ying] to outsource [law's] dilemmas
to experts").
41. See HENRY J. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FOUND
INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL 47-54 (1979) (reporting that the majority of
competency hearings observed in the study were extremely brief and that the judge
routinely approved the evaluator's conclusion).
42. See FELDMAN, supra note 37, at 13-14 (criticizing internalizing and
externalizing strategies for distorting the image of science and law).
43. See id. at 159 ("[Slcience does have an important role to play in the legal
process. As long as that role is properly recognized as supportive of rather than
replacing the functioning of law, science can help guide and illuminate policy, while
allowing the law to operate within its own parameters.").
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capacities to do justice." I think the optimistic predictions about
neuroscience fit this analysis precisely. At last, people believe, we
will have sufficiently good and powerful science to help the law
resolve the normative questions that inevitably bedevil us. But
the outcome is not enhanced legal resolution; it is the increasing
incidence of the juropathology of BOS.
More specifically, why has neuroscience especially captured
the imagination of criminal law scholars and practitioners?" Why
do so many enthusiasts seem to have extravagant expectations
about the contribution of neuroscience to criminal law? Here are
my speculations about the source for the two major types of
advocacy bias I have identified: reformation and revolution. The
reformers do not want to abandon criminal justice concepts,
doctrines, practices, and institutions as we know them; they
simply want to alter them in ways that the advocates find
normatively desirable. Proponents for the differential, softer
treatment of juveniles, opponents of the death penalty, and those
who think that neuroscience will demonstrate that many more
offenders should be excused and do not deserve the harsh
punishments imposed by the United States criminal justice system
fit into this camp of reformers suffering from advocacy bias. The
reformers are so eager to achieve their desired result that they will
either uncritically over-claim both the validity and legal relevance
of the neuroscience, or they will simply grasp at rhetorical
relevance if they believe that it helps their cause. The use of
neuroscience is not new in this respect. Decades ago, advocates in
the criminal justice system tried to use psychodynamic psychology
for the same purposes. More recently, genetics has been employed
in a similar manner. In all cases, however, the claims are signs of
BOS or allied syndromes.
They persist in the face of
overwhelming contrary evidence because they produce what we
clinicians term, "secondary gain." The benefits of having the
disorder sufficiently outweigh the costs. Consequently, sufferers
are consciously or unconsciously willing to recognize the reality
and to become well again.
The use of legally irrelevant or weak science for reform by
advocates has many potential drawbacks. First, it may deflect
44. See id. at 195 ("The powerful allure of science flows in part from our
distress over the weakness and imperfection of law.").
45. Criminal law is by no means the only field in which practitioners have
hopes for neuroscience. Other examples are lie detection and the objective
measurement of pain. But neuroscience has been especially embraced by criminal
lawyers.
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attention from more important questions and data. Focusing on
the adolescent brain rather than on sociocultural variables is a
good example. Second, it can have unintended consequences. The
same "hole in the head" that suggests that a capital defendant was
less culpable may also convince the sentencing jury that the
subject is more dangerous and should be put to death for that
reason. Third, it clogs the courts with irrelevant or weak evidence
that does not really answer the legal question or that is
misleading.
The infamous Supreme Court case, Barefoot v. Estelle,46 is a
classic example of the second and third problems mentioned above.
Barefoot was sentenced to death on the basis of a clinical
psychiatric prediction that he would be dangerous if he was not
executed." This prediction was based on answers to hypothetical
questions rather than on a clinical examination or other forms of
investigation, such as psychological testing. All the relevant
professional groups argued that such predictions were invalid and
Barefoot challenged the admission of the prediction on due process
grounds." The Court held that the accuracy of the prediction was
a matter of weight of the evidence and not of admissibility." At
the time, advocates of abolition of the death penalty were
surprisingly ambivalent about this holding. Many critics, such as
myself, had argued that much forensic psychiatric testimony
should not be admissible in criminal cases because it was either
scientifically or clinically weak or was legally irrelevant.50 But
such testimony could potentially be helpful for mitigation and
46. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
47. Id. at 884 ("The State also called two psychiatrists ... who, in response to
hypothetical questions, testified that petitioner would probably commit further acts
of violence and represent a continuing threat to society. The jury answered both of
the questions put to them in the affirmative, a result which required the imposition
of the death penalty.").
48. Id. at 920-22 (highlighting concerns of the American Psychiatric
Association and other scholars about utilizing psychiatric predictions of long-term
future dangerousness).
49. Id. at 902.
50. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 600-25 (1978). Although forensic
testimony is considerably better than it was when that article was published, too
much testimony is still weak or irrelevant and purely clinical predictions of future
dangerousness are still comparatively inaccurate. See Stephen J. Morse, The
Ethics of ForensicPractice: Reclaiming the Wasteland, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 206 (2008) (analyzing the contemporary state of forensic practice); Jennifer L.
Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 38 (2011) (assessing the state of violence
risk assessments).
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advocates of abolition feared careful, rigorous scrutiny of the
quality of psychiatric testimony generally. Thomas Barefoot was
executed.
In response to the third concern, some advocates correctly
note that the courts already admit a great deal of scientific,
clinical, and technical evidence that is either of poor quality or of
questionable legal relevance. They then ask, "What reason exists
not to permit introduction of neuroscience, which is no worse than
many other kinds of evidence that are routinely admitted?"" My
answer as a scholar and as a citizen is that we should not
perpetuate bad practice simply to achieve a preferred end.
Instead, we should attempt to limit the introduction of weak and
irrelevant evidence even if doing so undermines our attempts to
succeed with our normative agenda. If advocates have the better
argument, they should use good arguments to achieve their ends."
Revolutionaries subject to advocacy bias may be classified as
either weak or strong depending on how completely committed
they are to radical reform of criminal justice. They all have in
common an intense dislike of the concept and practice of
retributive justice, thinking that retribution is prescientific and
necessarily harshly punitive.
Their hope is that the new
neuroscience will convince the law at last that determinism is true
and that no offender is genuinely, ultimately responsible. The
weak revolutionaries are willing to continue holding people (faux)
responsible on consequential grounds, but then argue for a fully
consequential punishment system. Thus, the criminal justice
system will look much like the present system, except that
retributivism will play no role in blame and punishment. In
contrast, the strong revolutionaries believe that the only logical
conclusion is that the law should adopt a consequentially-based
prediction/prevention system of social control guided by the
knowledge of the neuroscientist-kings who will finally have
supplanted the Platonic philosopher-kings."
51. You Know Who You Are, unpublished public comments (on file in the
author's mind and never to be forgotten). I am especially agog when law professors
blithely state this position.
52. Let me be clear. I am a proponent of softening the legal response to
juvenile offenders and I am an opponent of capital punishment. At the same time,
however, I am a firm believer in honest and rational legal process. I do not
subscribe to using weak evidence or bad arguments to achieve my normative goals.
I believe that doing so ultimately undermines justice and the rule of law.
53. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes
Nothing and Everything, in LAW & THE BRAIN 207, 217-18, 224 (Semir Zeki &

Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006). Interestingly, Greene and Cohen admit that the
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Once again, the data from neuroscience or from other
sciences do not remotely conclude that we are not agents and that
retributive justice is incoherent." Neuroscience cannot prove that
determinism is true and determinism is not inconsistent with
genuine legal or moral responsibility." The strong revolutionary
claim is simply a speculative argument that assumes that the
mind-matter
reduction
project
and
hard-deterministic
incompatibilism are true. Moreover, our moral and legal practices
accept deontology in every context and most of the harshest
criminal justice policies in recent years-e.g., mandatory
minimum sentences, recidivist sentencing enhancements,
lengthier sentences generally, and quasi-criminal commitments of
so-called sexual predators-have been justified consequentially,
not retributively. The same has been true of the harsh treatment
of juveniles. In my opinion, factors such as the fear of juvenile
"superpredators," and not the belief that young people deserve
greater punishment, fueled the increased use of transfer and
harsh sentences for juveniles adjudicated as adults.
Incapacitation and deterrence, not retributive justice, were the
goals.
Why would anyone seriously recommend the strong
revolutionary's dehumanizing and almost certainly inhumane
legal regime given the current state of the science and
accompanying concepts? I am not sure of the answer, but I believe
that such overclaiming is a result of a combination of fulminant
BOS and misguided utopianism that can exist only in the rarefied
and other-worldly precincts of the academy. The secondary gain of
such unfortunate sufferers of BOS must be immense to permit
such extravagant overclaiming.
In my estimation, these
overclaimers are well-meaning, but suffer from severe
anosognosia, a condition in which the sufferer resolutely denies
that he or she is ill." There is a successful treatment, of course,
law may still have to punish some people for consequential reasons, but this is an
incoherent claim in light of their premises. Society may need to involuntary
restrain some dangerous human organisms (we used to call them persons), but
punishment-the intentional infliction of deserved pain associated with blame and
moral stigma on moral agents-would never be justified according to their own
premises. They are trying to have it both ways.
54. Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation?An Essay on Law and Neuroscience,
13 LAw & NEUROSCIENCE 529, 533-34 (2010).
55. Stephen J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in ForensicPsychiatry and

Psychology, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 203, 219 (2007).
56. Anosognosia is a term technically applied to sufferers from confirmed
neurological disorders who deny that a problem exists. In recent years, it has been

532

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 31:509

Cognitive Jurotherapy (CJ), but it is damnably difficult to
persuade subjects who suffer from agnosonogsia to accept the
unfortunate truth that CJ is indicated for their juropathological
condition. Unlike the advocates of involuntary intervention in the
lives of those who deny their allegedly dysfunctional behavior, I
believe that we should treat BOS sufferers with dignity, respect,
and kindness and try to persuade them voluntarily to seek a cure.
V. The Future of Law & Neuroscience: The Case for
Cautious Optimism
Despite my scientific and conceptual cautions at present and
my fear of virulent BOS, I am nonetheless optimistic about the
near- and intermediate-term contributions that neuroscience may
make to more rational, fair resolution of individual cases. I doubt
that we will have a sufficient neuroscientific data base for major
policy innovations, but assisting adjudication seems potentially
possible.
Perhaps the easiest contribution of neuroscience would be in
cases involving prediction, such as predicting future violence,
amenability to treatment, and other legally-relevant behavioral
predictions." Finding valid neural markers would not necessarily
require theoretical, conceptual, or causal understanding of why a
marker increases the accuracy of the prediction. It would be
sufficient if it were empirically confirmed that it does. Of course,
whether employing neuroscientific techniques for prediction would
be cost-benefit justified would depend on cost and the predictive
value-added of obtaining the neural marker compared to the cost
and accuracy of obtaining behavioral predictors.
Assessing criminal responsibility involves a retrospective
evaluation of the defendant's mental states at the time of the crime.

applied to people who deny that they suffer from mental disorders although
professionals believe that they do. Neurological illnesses have defined pathological
anatomies or physiologies, whereas mental disorders do not. Some people are crazy
whether or not there is a demonstrable, causal pathological anatomy or physiology
associated with their abnormal behavior. But who is genuinely crazy is often
disputable, especially in cases involving allegedly religious beliefs. Terming those
who deny that they have mental abnormalities as suffering from "agnosognosia"
simply begs the question against and demeans those who question whether they
are suffering from disorder. Some people are obviously psychotic and deny that
they are out of touch with reality, but we need not give that denial a reifying label
that does no additional work beyond the observations upon which it is based. As
the critique in this Article should make clear, I am of course being tongue-in-cheek
when I apply this further diagnosis to those who suffer from BOS.
57. See Aharoni et al., supra note 11.
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No criminal wears a portable scanner or other neurodetection device
that provides a measurement at the time of the crime, at least not
yet.'
Further, as we have seen, neuroscience is insufficiently
developed to detect specific, legally relevant mental content or to
provide a sufficiently accurate diagnostic marker for even a severe
mental disorder. Nonetheless, certain aspects of neural structure
and function that bear on legally relevant capacities, such as the
capacity for rationality and control, may be temporally stable in
general or in individual cases. If they are, neuroevidence may
permit a reasonably valid retrospective inference about the
defendant's rational and control capacities and their impact on
criminal behavior. This will of course depend on the existence of
adequate science to do this.
We currently lack such science, such as genuinely normative
data about adolescent brain structure and function, but future
research may provide the necessary information. In tandem with
the behavioral sciences, neuroscience might help us learn more
about the behavioral capacities that affect responsibility. This
hope is not inconsistent with my earlier claim that, for legal
purposes, neuroscience is the handmaiden of behavioral science.
It is often the case that our behavioral concepts are not as clear as
we would like. For example, the capacity for self-regulation is
enormously difficult to understand and is highly contested. Many
paradigms abound, usually using different methodologies, but we
still do not have anything approaching a firm understanding of
whether people cannot control themselves or whether they simply
will not control themselves. In such instances, my hope is that
behavioral and neuroscience together can help reach a conceptualempirical reflective equilibrium in which each type of science helps
refine the other's concepts, categories, and measures. Ultimately,
the behavioral understanding will be more important for the law
because the law's criteria are behavioral, but neuroscience might
help us better understand behavior. With such understanding, we
might be able to more accurately assess control difficulties and

58. Questions concerning competence or predictions of future behavior are based
on a subject's present condition (or confirmed historical facts in the case of
predictions). Thus, the problems besetting the retrospective responsibility analysis do
not apply to such issues. The criteria for competence are functional. They ask
whether the subject can perform some task-such as understanding the nature of a
criminal proceeding or understanding a treatment option that is offered-at a level
the law considers normatively acceptable to warrant respecting the subject's choice
and autonomy
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other legal criteria that are so difficult to apply.
The ability to guide therapeutic interventions is a more
speculative promise of neuroscience. If we do understand the
causal mechanisms underlying antisocial or other problematic
behaviors, perhaps we will be able to intervene effectively to
prevent these problems behaviorally and biologically. The failure
to
develop
genuinely
new,
effective,
and
safe
psychopharmacological agents in recent decades probably stems
from the inability to understand the relation of brain to mental
states. It is not clear if imaging studies will help end this
epistemological impasse, but if neuroscience is broadly understood
to encompass all physiochemical aspects of brain function, perhaps
it will. Except in a few cases of clear, medically well-characterized
illnesses such as epilepsy, however, this prospect is probably far
off, but it is not unthinkable.
In short, I have modest hopes for a neuroscientific
contribution to rational adjudication. I will be thrilled if this
contribution exceeds my expectations, but not surprised if it does
not or even if it fails simply to meet them.
Conclusion: The Cure
Living together is damnably hard. It would be a blessing if
science could provide a guide to how to live together more
successfully, but it cannot. Science inevitably has this limitation
because human behavior is so hard to understand and predict, the
scientific data are often less secure than we thought as paradigm
shifts demonstrate, and, most important, we disagree so
profoundly about the normative implications of the scientific data
for our communal lives. Neuroscience, like all the other sciences
advocates have used to promote their agendas, is unlikely to
radically transform the law. I predict that it will disappoint those
with extravagant or somewhat more modest expectations, much as
its predecessors did. BOS stands in the way of genuine normative,
social, and legal progress. It prevents realistic understanding of
what can be achieved through neuroscience, it creates doctrinal
confusion and inefficient adjudication, and it deflects attention
from more promising approaches to social melioration. CJ, which
is not an expensive therapy, is the solution. I fervently hope that
BOS sufferers will avail themselves of this excellent remedy.

